[Security][Go-live] Add authorization FallbackPolicy; lock down anonymous-by-omission API endpoints #415
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Reference: spikerj/spikersoft-issues#415
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Context: Pre-beta go-live hardening — not an active incident. The intended pattern already exists in
api-conventions.md(issue #312: controller[Authorize]+[AllowAnonymous]on public actions); it is just applied inconsistently.Problem:
DefaultPolicy = RequireAuthenticatedUser()is set, but there is noFallbackPolicy— so any controller with no auth metadata is anonymous. ~47 controllers are anonymous-by-omission, including sensitive ones.Evidence:
SpikerSoft.Api/Infrastructure/Authentication.cs:47-53— DefaultPolicy only, no FallbackPolicyUserController(Keycloak user dump +UpdateUser),CacheController(whole-cluster Redis flush → DoS),TwilioController(send-sms / make-call → toll fraud),Employees/Organizations/Customers(PII CRUD)Fix (order matters — do not break anonymous exploration):
[AllowAnonymous]+ public projections to the intended explore surface (see EPIC)FallbackPolicy = RequireAuthenticatedUser()so omissions fail closedAcceptance criteria:
FallbackPolicydenies un-annotated endpoints[Authorize](+ roles); explore endpoints carry explicit[AllowAnonymous]Effort: M · Part of the anonymous-surface EPIC (this batch). Related: #401 (SignalR hubs), #312.
Part of the anonymous-vs-authenticated surface epic #417. Sequence the FallbackPolicy flip behind the anonymous route walk (#314).
Anonymous-surface inventory (the FallbackPolicy impact set)
Built the prerequisite for safely enabling a
FallbackPolicy— a static analysis of all 73 API controllers classifying every action's auth posture. AFallbackPolicyonly applies to endpoints with no authorization metadata, so this is precisely the set the flip would newly affect.Method: per-controller scan of class-level + method-level
[Authorize]/[AllowAnonymous], honoring that class-level[AllowAnonymous]overrides method[Authorize]. Verified there are no custom base controllers and no global auth filter, so "no metadata" = genuinely anonymous today. (Heuristic scan — treat counts as ±a few.)Totals
[Authorize]at class or method)[AllowAnonymous]Class-level
[Authorize]: 23 controllers. Class-level[AllowAnonymous]: 1 (Trails).⚠️ The flip is NOT a blind switch
Of the ~135, some must stay anonymous and would break if the fallback locked them. They need an explicit
[AllowAnonymous]before the flip:AuthenticationController(~12: login/register/refresh/forgot-password). Locking these = nobody can log in.CodeRunner/CCodeRunner/CppCodeRunner.Run,Lessons.GetAllLessons/GetLessonById/GetReading/GetJourney,NetworkTools.GetNetworkInfo,Tools.PingHost,BookSearch.*. These are the product; several are intentionally public playground/demo (noteRunLessonis already[Authorize], but genericRunis not).Blogpublic reads,TermsOfService.GetLatest/GetById,Team.GetTeamMembers,Links.GetLinks,PostalCodes.Lookup/States.Get*(public form dropdowns),SystemInfo.GetVersion.Twilio(~9): must stay anonymous but should be signature-verified, not auth-gated.🔴 Genuine anonymous vulnerabilities today (the flip correctly protects — worth fixing regardless)
These have no legitimate anonymous caller:
Cache— anonymous Redis flush/stats. ✅ Shipped now: PR #119 (staff/admin).Create/Update/Delete:Employees,Customers,ServiceCalls,ServiceCallReasons,Parts,Labors,Milages,FuelTypes,GeneratorBrands,PhoneTypes,AddressTypes,States,Positions,PositionAssignments,Locations,Organizations. Anyone canDeleteEmployee/CreateStateunauthenticated. ~60 mutating actions.AI.GenerateEmbeddings— anonymous compute/cost lever.Recommended path (de-risks the go-live flip)
[Authorize]; leave their GETs pending the public-form question). I can ship these as a bounded PR set on your OK.[AllowAnonymous]to the must-stay-public list above (auth, student surface, public content, Twilio-with-signature).options.FallbackPolicy = RequireAuthenticatedUser()— at which point any new endpoint is protected-by-default, closing #417 structurally.Want me to proceed with step 1 (the field-service CRUD mutation lockdown) as the next PR? That's the highest-value unambiguous slice and needs no product decision (no legitimate anonymous
Delete/Create).Step 1 progress — PR #120 up. Locked the 6 unambiguous back-office controllers (
Employees,ServiceCalls,ServiceCallReasons,Parts,Labors,Milages) with class-level[Authorize]— closes anonymousCreate/Update/Deleteof internal staff/service data. PlusCachein #119. Both have reflection tests.Remaining anonymous-vuln cleanup (tracked, no product decision needed for the first, decision needed for the rest):
AddressTypes,FuelTypes,PhoneTypes,GeneratorBrands,States,Positions,Locations,Organizations) — need mutation-only method-level[Authorize](GETs may feed public dropdowns). I can do this next; it's mechanical but needs the "are any of these GETs actually public?" answer to decide class-vs-method.MarkWilsonsCustomerController— bespoke, has a commented-out//[Authorize]; wants a human look (is it live? customer PII).AI.GenerateEmbeddings— anonymous compute/cost lever.FallbackPolicyflip — the closing move for #417.✅ Anonymous-mutation surface closed. PR #121 gates the 6 reference/lookup controllers (
FuelTypes,GeneratorBrands,AddressTypes,PhoneTypes,States,Organizations) — mutations only (method-level[Authorize]), GETs left anonymous since some feed public dropdowns / an org-confirm link.Anonymous
Create/Update/Deleteis now closed across all three tranches: #119 (Cache), #120 (back-office), #121 (reference). All with reflection tests.Left for this epic (each needs your input, so not auto-shipping):
States/AddressTypesdropdowns,Blogreads,Team,BookSearch, etc.) vs. should be gated.[AllowAnonymous]on auth/login, the student learning surface, public content, and Twilio (signature-verified).FallbackPolicyflip itself (the #417 closer), safe only after the allowlist is in place.PRs #119, #120, #121 all merged to master (
9d74b44). The anonymous-mutation surface is now closed in production:CacheController(Redis flush/stats) → staff/adminEmployees/ServiceCalls/ServiceCallReasons/Parts/Labors/Milages) →[Authorize][Authorize]Keeping open for the closer: anonymous-read classification (which by-omission GETs are legitimately public), the must-stay-anonymous allowlist (auth/student/public/Twilio), and the
FallbackPolicyflip (#417). Those need your product input on the public-GET question.AI.GenerateEmbeddingscompute-lever closed — PR #150. It was the last item from the inventory's "genuine anonymous vulnerabilities" list that needed no product decision:AIControllerwas anonymous-by-omission and dispatches GPU/embeddings jobs over RabbitMQ (unauthenticated cost/availability lever; it already logged the caller's identity, so it expected auth). Added class-level[Authorize]+ reflection tests, matching the #120/#121 pattern.Anonymous write/compute surface is now fully closed: #119 (Cache), #120 (back-office), #121 (reference mutations), #150 (embeddings). What's left for the epic all needs your input: the anonymous-read classification (which by-omission GETs are legitimately public), the must-stay-anonymous allowlist (auth/student/public/Twilio-signature), and the
FallbackPolicyflip (#417 closer).MarkWilsonsCustomerController(commented-out//[Authorize], possible customer PII) also still wants a human look.MarkWilsonsCustomerControllerclosed — PR #153. Re-examined it (I'd flagged it for "a human look"): it's live and exposes customer PII (names, addresses, phone numbers, generators, service history) via anonymousGET/GET{id}/POST/PUT, with a stray//[Authorize]commented out. Anonymous customer-PII CRUD has no legitimate caller regardless of the "is it live" question, so it's the same no-decision secure-by-default gate as the #120/#121 tranche — added class-level[Authorize]+ reflection tests (6/6).Anonymous write/compute/PII surface is now fully closed: #119 (Cache), #120 (back-office), #121 (reference mutations), #150 (embeddings), #153 (customer PII). Everything anonymous-by-omission that mutates or exposes sensitive data is gated.
What remains for the epic is all genuinely decision-dependent (your call): the anonymous-read classification (which by-omission GETs are legitimately public — States/AddressTypes dropdowns, Blog/Team/BookSearch reads, etc.), the must-stay-anonymous allowlist (auth/student-surface/public-content/Twilio-signature), and then the
FallbackPolicyflip that structurally closes #417.Board-sweep status (2026-07-22): six+ controller lockdowns + webhook HMACs merged. REMAINING: the HEADLINE item — no FallbackPolicy in SpikerSoft.Api Authentication (grep-verified absent).